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3 June 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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25X1

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-UAR: Soviet-UAR cooperation in international front organizations such as the Afro-Asian "solidarity movement" appears to be steadily deteriorating as a result of Nasir's attacks on Communists and the bloc.

Cairo has apparently decided not to send a UAR delegation to the Communist World Youth Festival in Vienna this summer.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK Indonesia: The Constituent Assembly's failure on final reading to adopt President Sukarno's proposal for a return to the 1945 constitution creates a political stalemate in Indonesia. While some compromise might yet be worked out, Sukarno and the army may impose the 1945 constitution, which gives the executive greater political power. Already army chief Nasution, in what may be a preliminary step, has banned "all political activity in Indonesia."

25X1

III. THE WEST

N *o* Nicaragua: President Somoza's public admission that revolutionaries have landed may encourage additional labor and other uncommitted groups to join the general strike, which has already attracted considerable support and should reach its peak on 3 June. Despite the imposition of martial law and the arrest of opposition leaders, the government faces serious domestic defiance for the first time in its 25 years. While several external threats remain, the Costa Rican Government has acted swiftly to prevent further attacks from its territory by Nicaraguan revolutionaries.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION

OK The USIB has taken note of the following conclusions reached by its special committee on the Berlin situation. The committee pointed out that its conclusions are to be used in context with SNIE 100-2-59 (24 February 1959) and with the review of that estimate in SNIE 100-2/1-59 (17 March 1959):

1. There is no indication of any change in the basic Soviet position at Geneva, but Khrushchev in Tirana appeared to introduce a harder line by categorically rejecting all parts of the Western package plan for Berlin.

3 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

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2. So long as the USSR estimates that negotiations at Geneva are promising or that the prospects for a summit meeting are good, it will probably not go so far as to turn over access controls to the GDR. However, negotiations may be reaching a stage where the USSR might consider it to be advantageous to increase the threats of such action. The actual physical transfer of controls could be accomplished with little or no warning.

3. While there are no reliable indications of a bloc intent to deny Allied or West German access to West Berlin, or to seal off West Berlin in the immediate future, the USSR could take such actions with little or no warning.

4. There have been no significant changes in Soviet capabilities to respond to possible Western actions in the event of turnover, harassment, or blockade.

5. The rumor in West Berlin that the US might give up RIAS has resulted in declining staff morale. RIAS is an important symbol of the US position in Berlin.

25X1

3 June 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004500200001-9

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet-UAR Cooperation in International Fronts Declining


The rift between Moscow and Cairo produced by Nasir's attacks on Communists and the bloc has caused a steady deterioration in Soviet-UAR cooperation in international front organizations. The Afro-Asian solidarity movement, which has depended on the cooperation of the UAR and other Afro-Asian countries with the Communists, has been particularly affected.



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The national solidarity committees on which the international organization theoretically is based have also encountered difficulties, because the committees of some neutralist countries such as India apparently are split between Communist and neutralist elements as a result of Nasir's charges. A critical period for the movement may well occur when preparations are begun for a second "Solidarity Conference"--a repeat of the December 1957 meeting held in Cairo--and for the Afro-Asian Women's Conference. Both are scheduled for later this year.

There are indications of frictions between Cairo and Moscow in other international front activities. Cairo has apparently decided not to send a delegation to the Communist-run World Youth Festival in Vienna this summer.



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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Political Stalemate in Indonesia

The Constituent Assembly's third rejection on 2 June of President Sukarno's proposal for the readoption of the 1945 constitution has created a political stalemate in Indonesia. Opposition to the constitution, under which both Sukarno and the army would gain increased political power at the expense of party activity, came from the Moslem parties, including the pivotal Nahdlatul Ulama party, which insisted on the incorporation of religious guarantees for the Islamic religion. The initiative now returns to President Sukarno and the army.

Sukarno, now in the United States, will be met and briefed at his next major stop--Tokyo--probably on 6 June by Ruslan Abdulgani, head of the appointive national council and a Sukarno confidant. It has been speculated that the President's two-month world tour was timed to keep him uninvolved in the political maneuvers attending the constitutional debates and free to work out new arrangements if necessary.

Although further attempts at compromise cannot be ruled out, army leaders have consistently hinted that they would take action to enforce the 1945 constitution if necessary.

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Nasution on 2 June banned all political activity, possibly as a preliminary move to further action. Prime Minister Djuanda had told the assembly that failure to accept the constitution might precipitate "undesirable events" similar to those which "have taken place in neighboring countries"--obviously a thinly veiled warning of an army take-over.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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III. THE WEST

Situation in Nicaragua

President Somoza's public admission that revolutionaries have landed may encourage additional labor and other uncommitted groups to join the general strike, which has already attracted more support than anticipated and should reach its peak on 3 June. Despite the imposition of martial law and the arrest of opposition leaders, the government faces serious domestic defiance for the first time in 25 years.

There are apparently no immediate plans to call for action by the Organization of American States, since President Echandi of Costa Rica has already acted to prevent the many Nicaraguan exiles in his country from further attacks on Nicaragua by land or air.


The National Guard under General Anastasio Somoza, Jr., is considered capable of containing the small rebel groups reported to have landed. It apparently remains loyal, although several former guard officers have recently taken refuge in Costa Rica and may have joined the exiles. [REDACTED]

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